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Upon Information and Belief
We noticed in the January issue of the District of Columbia Bar
Association JOURNAL that Judge Wiley Rutledge of the United States
Court of Appeals was to address that association on January 13 on the
subject, "The Written Brief from the Point of View of a Judge of the
Court of Appeals." Now to many of you, that may not be of particular
interest, but to us it is very important. You see, years ago the judge
used to teach us Torts, et cetera, et cetera, and it is highly gratifying to
know that we then gave him such good training that he has been able to
advance to his high office and be permitted to speak to those august
lawyers in the nation's capitol. Not only that, but we are sure that the
preliminary material for his subject was acquired from our tort briefs
which we copied out of somebody else's notebook.
Donald M. Lesher, who was recently injured in an airplane crash
while serving with the navy, has returned to Denver, where he plans to
practice law. He was admitted to the bar last year.
The state bar association's committee on national defense has been
preparing a manual for use by all state bar associations on the methods
and procedure to be used in setting up local and state committees and on
the machinery and functions to be developed by these committees. Work
of drafting the manual has been undertaken by John L. Zanoni of Denver, chairman of the committee, with the help of Fraser Arnold of Denver, regional chairman of the national bar committee. This manual
will be sent out by the national committee on defense of the American
Bar Association to all states in the Union.
COLORADO BAR CALENDAR
February 2
- Meeting of Denver Bar Association
-- Meeting Junior Bar Section at Denver
February 14
Institute at Glenwood Springs
February 20-21
- ---February 28
Institute at Greeley
Meeting of House of Delegates, A. B. A., Chicago
March 2, 3
M arch ----------------------------------. ----------------------Institu te at L o v elan d
March
Institute at Colorado Springs
A p ril - ---------------------------..-----Law D ay, U niversity of Colorado
....
-Institute
and Fish Fry, Monte Vista
May ---
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New Rules for the District Courts
The proposed new rules for use in the Denver district courts are now
in substantially final form and perhaps will have been adopted before
this issue of DICTA is delivered.
The Colorado District Judges Association has been working for
some time on the formulation of new rules in the hope that those rules,
outside of Denver, might be made uniform. Because of the greater number of judges in Denver and the use of the master docket, the rules in
Denver must necessarily deviate somewhat. It was hoped that this program might have been advanced at the judge's association meeting scheduled for January 9 in Glenwood Springs and the Denver judges had
delayed the adoption of the new Denver rules until after that date. However, because of the weather (the censor says we can now let out the
secret), many of the judges could not be present, and the meeting was
therefore indefinitely postponed.
The expected adoption of the new rules by the Denver judges at
their meeting on January 13 was delayed when a committee of the bar
met with the judges and asked for further consideration of the rule on
pre-trial conferences. Tbe committee felt that the pre-trial conference
should be held before the case was placed on the master docket. Judge
Robert W. Steele was appointed by the judges, as a committee of one
to confer with the bar committee.
Some change has been made in the operation of the master docket
which it is hoped will save the time of attorneys. A jury will be called
on alternate fortnights, that is, there will be two weeks of jury cases,
then two weeks of court cases and so on. A full call of the master
docket will be had only once, the second Monday, in each term, at which
time all attorneys having cases will be expected to be present. At that
time all cases will be given a trial order number. Other cases may be
added until the next full call. No individual notices will be given to
attorneys of the full call, but when other calls of the docket are made
during the term, only the top twenty-five cases will be called each time,
and the attorneys affected will be given notice of the call by the clerk.
Unless notified, attorneys need not be present at the secondary calls.
The next full call of the master docket will be on January 26. In
addition to this, full calls will be had at the beginning of the April and
September terms.
Remember Pearl Harbor ....

Buy Defense Bonds and Stamps

Affiliated Plan Proposed
for National Bar
BY WILBUR F. DENIOUS*
A famous philosopher (Mr. Dooley) once said:

if the Christian

Scientist had a little more science, and the doctor had a little more Christianity, it wouldn't make much difference which treated the patient,
provided he had a good nurse.
The integrated plan of bar organization has its faults and virtues;
the voluntary plan has a variety of forms, some faults and some merit.
But it really doesn't make so much difference which plan is used, provided the organization has an enthusiastic, united bar behind it.
BAR ORGANIZATION IN GENERAL

The first bar organization in this country, the Association of the
Bar of the City of New York, was formed in 1870. It still exists and
has made a notable record as a voluntary organization.
The American Bar Association was formed as a voluntary organization in 1878. At that time there were fifteen known state and local
bar associations in the country. By 1900 this number had increased to
about 300, and now there are over 1,500 bar organizations, their combined memberships embracing more than seventy per cent of the practicing lawyers of the country. All bar organizations were formed on
the voluntary plan until 1919, when the integrated plan was first introTHE VOLUNTARY PLAN
duced.
The successful record many state organizations have made under
the integrated plan demonstrates that it has many outstanding virtues.
But, in the opinion of a majority of the bar in many states, the integrated plan does not best fit their conditions. It is well known that
different forms of government fit different stages of civilization, and it
may well be that one plan of bar organization does not best meet the
conditions in each and every state. No aspersions are intended by this
comparison, for we cannot now be sure that government recently has
been improving or civilization recently advancing.
It is not my purpose to attack the integrated plan or to make a
comparison of its faults and virtues with those of any other plan, but
rather to point out the advantages of the voluntary plan.
*Of the Denver bar. This paper was given by Mr. Denious at the recent meeting
of the American Bar Association in Indianapolis and was carried in part in the December,
1941, issue of the JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY. After the
editor of the JOURNAL had given us permission for a reprint, Mr. Denious furnished
us his entire manuscript. We liked it so much that we decided to print it in full.
While the address was delivered to the national association, its contents are of equal.
perhaps even greater, interest to members of the state and local associations.
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One of its advantages is universality, another mobility, but perhaps
its greatest virtue is its voluntary characteristic. It has such a variety of
forms as to make its application universal. It has no fixed, rigid requirements which cannot be moulded to fit any circumstance. These with
its voluntary character give it a strong appeal to the lawyer who has a
passion for freedom of action, and loathes to find himself driven to any
position or condition in which he must remain or to which he must
conform. This is distasteful not only to the lawyer but to everyone
who prefers to volunteer rather than be drafted.
But perhaps the greatest weaknesses of the voluntary plan are that
it hasn't the power to draft and that all the members of the bar do not
volunteer. These disadvantages can be more than overcome if the members of the bar can be induced to volunteer. Volunteers make better
members of bar organizations just as volunteers make better soldiers.
MEMBERSHIP REDUCED BY RESTRICTIONS

Almost seventy per cent of the members of the bar are members of
local bar associations. Only about seventeen per cent are members of the
American Bar Association, and a somewhat larger percentage are members of the state associations. Practically every local association prescribes several qualifications for membership, in addition to being a member of the bar. The state associations generally demand more qualifications for membership than the local, and the national organizations'
requirements are more inconvenient to comply with than those of the
state. In other words, it is made comparatively easy and convenient to
become a member of the local organization, harder and less convenient
to become a member of the state association, and least convenient to become a member of the national organization. The result is the local
associations have the largest membership, the state associations next largest, and the national smallest. Isn't it apparent that the voluntary associations have not tried to organize the bar; they have attempted to organize merely a portion of it, that portion only which comes within their
prescribed qualifications for membership? For reasons which have disappeared, voluntary bar associations still seek to restrict their membership, and they suffer from lack of membership more than from any other
one cause. Under the integrated plan, every member of the bar is compelled to become a member of the state organization, and this gives the
plan its greatest strength. Under the voluntary plan, membership has
been discouraged by requirements and restrictions which make it difficult
to induce membership. If a bar association pretends to represent the
bar, then every member of the bar in good standing should be eligible
to membership. Every lawyer is either fit for membership or should be
disbarred. If he should be disbarred, proceedings have been instituted
against him or the bar association is derelict in its duty. If bar associa-
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tions will do their duty, they can safely make only one qualification for
membership, namely, membership of the bar in good standing. If that
were done, membership would increase, financial problems would be
relieved, the organization would become representative of the bar and
its influence greatly increased.
AFFILIATION PLAN

Some of our most successful state associations have clung to the
strictly voluntary plan. Others have followed a modified plan, such as
the federation or affiliation plan.
The affiliation plan is the one used in Colorado. Under this plan
any local bar association of the state may upon application become affiliated with the state association. The local associations admit to membership. and a member of a local association is ipso facto a member of the
state association. The dues of the state association are added to those of
the local, collected by the local and remitted to the state. The foregoing
are the essential features of the plan, and these with certain minor features, not necessarily distinctive, such as provisions to insure that each
section of the state has representation on the governing board, a fair
chance in the election of officers, etc., constitute the plan. A minor
feature and yet one worth mentioning is a provision for the election each
year of a president-elect who is ex-officio a member of the governing
board and a member of the executive committee. After an experience of
one year with the association's affairs and an opportunity to formulate a
plan for his own administration, the president-elect automatically one
year after his election becomes president, fully equipped to assume his
duties without delay.
RESULTS UNDER AFFILIATED PLAN

The results which such a plan is likely to effect are:
1. A comprehensive membership in the state association, selected
by those who are best acquainted with the applicants.
2. Adequate financial resources, sufficient funds to support an
active program.
3. An organization which is in fact representative of the state bar,
with sufficient strength and influence to perform its functions and to compel adoption of any sound propositions which it develops and proves.
Such a plan was adopted in Colorado in 1938 and the results are:
1. The membership of the state association has increased over
five hundred per cent.
2. The dues have been decreased fifty per cent and the income
increased nearly three hundred per cent.
3.
The state association is recognized as a strong, active, influen-
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tial body. Its members are united and enthusiastic. It is undertaking
and doing well the work which a state bar should do. For instance, the
state Supreme Court adopted last January and put into effect on April
6, 1941, a revised Code of Procedure which was the result of three years
of sustained and diligent effort of the Colorado Bar Association. That
work required talent and funds as well as effort, and all three were furnished by the state association. It has many other valuable accomplishments accredited to it for its work during the past three years and has a
worthwhile program ahead. Its programs at annual meetings have so
improved that the attendance has increased about five hundred per cent.
There have been too many demonstrations of success under the
integrated plan as well as under the voluntary plan to attempt an argument against either as a plan. One or the other may be more suitable
for a given set of circumstances, and when a plan is to be adopted, both
should be given careful consideration.
The American Bar Association has been zealous in disseminating
information and in building up a literature on the subject of bar organization. But its precepts might have been more effective if it had set a
better example. To many the plan of organization and accomplishments
of the American Bar Association are not in keeping with the field it
occupies. After all, the effectiveness of an organization should be measured by its responsibilities and the opportunities available to it.
WHAT'S THE MATTER WITH THE A. B. A.?

The obvious defects of the American Bar Association are these:
1. A small membership. It has never had as members more than
twenty per cent of the profession. The organization of a profession
must have a majority of its members or it will not adequately represent
the profession; it cannot speak effectively for the profession. The American Bar Association is therefore not the organization of the legal profession; it is an organization of only a small minority of the legal profession.
2. Insufficient funds to carry on an active constructive program.
An increase in individual membership dues would probably not increase
the association's gross income, which is only about one-sixth of that of
the American Medical Association, although the number of doctors in
the country is considerably less than that of lawyers.
3. Want of influence. It cannot perform the functions of a national organization, and lacks the strength to compel adoption of the
measures which it recommends and the merits of which it attempts to
prove. These weaknesses largely flow from the fact that it is not representative of the profession and that it lacks strong and effective affiliation
and connection with the other bar organizations of the country.
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WHAT ARE THE REMEDIES?

The remedies are not always as apparent as the defects, but in this
case some are quite obvious.
1. Membership of the bar in good standing, or at most, membership in the local or state association of applicant's residence, should be
the only qualification for membership in the American Bar Association.
2. A plan should be adopted providing for federation or affiliation of the local and state associations with the national, with concurrent
membership, one charge to cover all dues, and the work and functions of
these organizations should be planned and coordinated.
Such an attractive offer of affiliation could be made to the state associations, to those integrated as well as to those under the voluntary plan,
mutually advantageous to both the state and national organizations, that
acceptance would follow from the point of self interest alone, without
consideration of the other important values which would be sure to
follow.

The American Bar Association membership has not even kept pace
with the growth of the profession. It has never had in its membership
more than one-fifth of the lawyers, and now has about one-sixth. It
has made sporadic efforts to place individuals on its membership rolls,
but without even the hope, much less assurance, of reaching a majority
of the profession. That method has been defeated in part by restrictive
qualifications for membership instead of urging membership upon every
lawyer who is a member in good standing of the bar of his state, or of his
state or local bar association.
But that method has failed and now has .no chance to succeed. If
it is desirable to keep the membership comparatively small and restricted,
not representative of the profession, then the present method should be
continued; otherwise, some other method should be tried.
Other groups have flourished under the federation or affiliation plan.
The medical profession is comparable to the legal profession, and it is
therefore fair to compare the American Medical Association with the
American Bar Association.
The American Medical Association is a federation of forty-eight
state associations, and each state association has as its affiliates the local
medical association of the state. The members of each local association
are members of the state association and likewise members of the national
association with one membership fee for all three. This places on the
membership roll of the American Medical Association about sixty-seven
per cent of the whole profession.
Action taken by the American Medical Association is the action of
a two-thirds majority of the profession; standards fixed by it are the
standards of the profession. Requirements for medical instruction and
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preliminary education are readily complied with by the medical schools.
Its income, about six times that of our national organization, enables it
to do extensive work in research, gather valuable data and obtain the best
expert advice before taking action affecting the public or the work of the
profession. Its record shows astounding results.
An editorial appearing in the JOURNAL of the national organization, nine years after the federation plan was adopted, summed up progress at that time as follows:
"During the past nine years the American Medical Association
has accomplished more for improvement of conditions in the profession, and for the good of the public, than during all the previous
years of its existence. (It was organized sixty-three years before.)
This is a strong statement, but a true one. What has been accomplished was made possible by the reorganization of the Association
and its various branches."
The medical profession has in a substantial way realized the advantages of the voluntary plan of organization. The plan used by the doctors was worked out by members of the legal profession. Lawyers are
supposed to have special ability and originality in formulating and executing organization plans. The American Bar Association is thus
another case of the shoemaker's children going without shoes.
If the national association would devote to an improvement of its
own organization a small fraction of the effort that it has given to the
better organization of state associations, it would be doing a most valuable and a much needed service for the legal profession. Of course, only
the voluntary plan of organization is available to the American Bar Association.
Our profession is capable of producing an effective plan of organization. Such a plan is not only desirable-it is imperative. These two
statements being all but universally accepted, it behooves us to fashion
the plan and put it into operation.

President Appoints Committee on
Constitutional Rights
Due to the war the executive committee of the Denver Bar Association deemed it advisable to create a committee on constitutional rights.
The president has accordingly appointed the following committee, to
whom all such matters should be referred:
W. W. Grant, chairman,
S. M. January,
Peter H. Holme,
W. E. Hutton,
Samuel D. Menin.

Alva Blanchard Adams
United States Senator Alva Blanchard Adams died in Washington
in the early morning of December 1, 1941, as the result of a coronary
thrombosis, thought to have been brought on by excessive work in disregard of physicians' orders.
He was born in Del Norte, Colorado, October 29, 1875. In 1882
his family moved to Pueblo, which remained his home until his death.
Alva, as all lawyers knew him, prepared for college at Andover and from
there went to Yale, from which he was grauated in 1896 as a bachelor
of philosophy. Three years later he obtained his LL.B. at Columbia
University and that year began practice in Pueblo. On May 11, 1908,
he and Robert S. Gast formed the partnership of Adams £d Gast, which
continued until it was dissolved by the death of the senior partner.
From 1908 to 1910 he served as County Attorney of Pueblo
County. He was a member of the Charter Convention of Pueblo in
19 11 and from the adoption of the charter in that year to 19 15, he was
the City Attorney of Pueblo.
During the years 19 10 and 1911 he was a member of the Board
of Regents of the University of Colorado, and in 19 16 was a delegate at
large to the Democratic National Convention. In 1917 he was chairman of the Pueblo Council of Defense and for the two years following
was stationed in Washington as Major in the Judge Advocate General's
department.
He was appointed by Governor Sweet in 1923 to the United States
Senate to fill the unexpired term caused by the death of Samuel D. Nicholson. In the election of 1924 he was defeated by Senator Phipps and
for the next eight years devoted his time to the practice of the law, in
which he has not been active since his election to the Senate in 1932, and
his reelection in 1938.
As president of The Pueblo Savings and Trust Company, as partner in The Holmes Hardware Company, and in other fields, Senator
Adams had broad business interests, but his lasting reputation will be
grounded on his work in the Senate. Following the funeral services held
in Pueblo on December 4, Senator Burton K. Wheeler said of him:
"Colorado has sent many prominent men to the United States
Senate, but she has never sent a man to the United States Senate
that was more outstanding or more beloved by both Republicans
and Democrats than Alva Adams.

DICTA
"The passing of Alva Adams is a distinct loss, not only to
his friends and his family, but to the people of the entire state of
Colorado and the entire West, as well as the people of the nation
as a whole.
"A member of the powerful appropriations committee of the
Senate, he scrutinized every appropriation of the taxpayer's money
with a view to trying to see that your money would not be wasted.
He was not always successful, but it was never his fault. It will
be difficult to find a man who can take his place on that committee,
or to take his place in the Senate. His energy, his devotion to the
people's interest was supreme. He represented the best type of
Americanism. He was a devoted husband, father, and truly a great
statesman."

William S. Jackson Sworn in as Justice
of Colorado Supreme Court
William Sharpless Jackson was sworn in as a justice of the Supreme
Court of Colorado in a short but impressive ceremony held on January
5, 1942. Justice Jackson was presented to the court by Governor Ralph
L. Carr, who had appointed him to fulfill the vacancy left on the bench
by the recent death of Chief Justice Francis E. Bouck. Justice John C.
Young is the new chief justice.
Justice Jackson, who was born in Colorado Springs on March 22,
1889, was formerly a member of the law firm of Haney & Jackson of
Colorado Springs. He was president of the Colorado Bar Association
in 1934, and has served as a trustee for Colorado College for many
years, being elected as chairman of the Board of Trustees in 1939. He
has been active in many civic affairs, servhig on the local school board,
the board of trustees of the local public library, and the board of directors of the First National Bank of Colorado Springs.
He has maintained a deep interest in bar activities. In addition to
serving as president of the state bar, he is a past president of the El
Paso County Bar Association, and a former member of the Board of
Bar Examiners. His legal education was obtained from Denver University, he having previously been graduated with a B.A. degree from
Harvard in 1911. Shortly after his graduation from law school he was
an agent of the Department of Justice. He resigned from this position
in 1919 to enter private practice in Colorado Springs, where he maintained an office until his recent appointment to the Supreme Court.
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Colorado Bar Association Acts
on Important Matters
The Board of Governors of the Colorado Bar Association in a meeting held in Denver on December 19, 1941, approved a plan whereby
the entire bar association may have the benefit of low-rate health and
accident insurance. By this action, the state bar becomes one of the first
state bar associations to provide a plan so that its members can be insured as a group against loss occasioned by conditions of poor health or
accident.
The plan is similar to the one approved by the Denver Bar Association on October 6, 1941. It provides for 365 consecutive days of benefit
for each and every attack of sickness and includes benefits for medical
reimbursement, and principal sum payments in event of accidental death.
Full details of the plan will be supplied to each member of the Colorado
Bar Association by pamphlet within a few days. Officers of the various
local bar associations will be contacted and the details of the plan outlined to them by officials of the Commercial Casualty Insurance Company, represented by the Edward Udry Agency of Denver, who carries a
letter of authorization from the Board of Governors. The insurance is
available only to members of the Colorado Bar Association in good
standing.
The board also approved the appointment of a committee to explain to the public the effect of the statute* which will outlaw certain
trust deeds and mortgages on March 28, 1942, unless the same have been
properly extended. Percy Morris of Denver was appointed chairman of
a committee to take action on this subject and to give such publicity to the
matter as the committee felt proper in the name of the state bar.
A resolution was addressed to the Supreme Court by the board
requesting that in the future the court give it notice of all applications
for reinstatement or readmission filed in that court by disbarred or suspended lawyers.
The secretary's office of the Colorado Bar Association has been
requested to prepare an exhibit of the work being done by the state bar
so that it might be shown at the regional conferences of bar executives
now being held at various points in the east and south. These regional
conferences are held under the auspices of the section on bar activities of
the American Bar Association in an effort to stimulate various activities
in state and local associations and to bring about an exchange of ideas.
*COLO. STAT. ANN. (1935)

c. 40, §§122-134.
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Fable of the Highly Successful Lawyer
and the Jealous Mistress
BY RICHARD C. HEATON*

Once Upon a Time there was a Highly Successful Lawyer who
looked forward to the day when he could Retire and Do the Things he
had Always Wanted to Do.
In his first year at Law School his favorite professor had warned
him that the Law was a Jealous Mistress and he never Forgot it. From
that day forward he devoted his life to the Law, but he didn't have
much Fun.
At Law School he had no time for Friends, Frolic or Females; he
always Had to Study. While he was a Young Lawyer building up his
Practice, he had no time for Divots, Drink or Dalliance; he always
Had to Work. In the period when he was a Successful Lawyer, he had
no time for his Helpmeet, Home, or Heirs; he was a Slave to the Law.
During all these years, he kept Promising Himself that when he
had become a Highly Successful Lawyer, he would Retire and Enjoy
Life. He would catch up on Everything he had Missed and make up
for all the Work, Wear and Woe which he had Endured.
He was never unmindful of the Sacrifices he was making to become
a Highly Successful Lawyer. He knew that he was Paying the Price.
His Wife and Children could scarcely Identify him without his Bertillon measurements. His Associates and Acquaintances unanimously
considered him an Old Sourpuss, and Made No Bones About It. He
Deplored the fact that he didn't know Anything about Anything except
the Law, for he had Never Found Time to Roam, Read or Relax. He
was always Tired and Unhappy and besides, as he approached his Goal,
he gradually acquired a touch of Tummy Trouble, which he dismissed
as a mere Trifle when compared with his other Sacrifices.
One day, at Long Last, he knew that he was a Highly Successful
Lawyer and planned, upon the Morrow, to lock the Office and Depart
the Practice Forever. He would Get Acquainted with the Wife of his
Bosom and the Children of his Loins. He would show his old Associates and Acquaintances that he was Not Such a Bad Guy After All.
He would Read the Books he had always wanted to read; he would
Travel; he would Learn to Play Golf; he would Really Live. And of
Course he would Do Something about his Tummy Trouble, which,
while a Trifle, was Annoying.
But that night, Unfortunately, his Tummy Trouble Got Him.

Moral:

De minimis non curat lex.

*Of the Los Angeles bar. Reprinted by permission from the November, 1941,
issue of the (Los Angeles) BAR BULL ETIN.

Is Your Business Covered by the
Wage- Hour Law?
BY

KENNETH MONTGOMERY*

It would be easy, in discussing the coverage of the Fair Labor Standards Act, to perform like a medieval monk discussing the nature of ultimate reality. No doubt some of you who have had occasion to discuss
coverage problems with officers of the Wage and Hour Division have
been convinced that we delight in splitting hairs and being very technical
about complex problems.
However, the truth is that the fundamental principles which determine coverage under the Fair Labor Standards Act are not difficult to
grasp, and I believe that they can be stated with some degree of clarity.
It is only when discussion shifts to borderline cases that we are likely to
become involved in what may seem to many lawyers to be a novel conception of interstate commerce. Even in this field it has been our experience that the novelty of the conception involved is almost wholly explained by the fact that many practicing lawyers think of interstate
commerce in terms of the conceptions which judicially determine the
scope of the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887.
The Wage-Hour law represents something new in action by the
federal government. In the broadest sense, it is social legislation designed to meet problems growing out of increasing industrialization
Even before the act became effective, the offices of the Division in Washington were deluged by inquiries from all parts of the country, from
employers and lawyers seeking information concerning the scope of the
act and the application of the act to their interests. At that time there
were two alternatives for the Division. The officers might have sent to
each inquirer a copy of the act, and told him, "Here it is, Brother-figure
it out for yourself." That is the policy pursued by many governmental
agencies. On the other hand, the officers of the Division could give to
people asking questions their best opinion. The latter policy was
adopted for a number of reasons.
In addition to writing individual answers to thousands of inquiries,
the offices of the Wage-Hour Division have issued statements known as
Interpretative Bulletins. These bulletins were simply compilations of
answers to questions most frequently asked. They do not have the
effect of law, but are simply a statement of the construction of the Fair
Labor Standards Act which guides the Administrator in the performance
of his enforcement duties. These basic interpretative documents are now
*Regional Attorney, Wage-Hour Division of the Department of Labor.
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being supplemented and in some instances corrected or extended by the
decisions of courts. In the last analysis, the scope of the act must be
determined by the courts, for the Administrator must apply to the court
for appropriate action whenever, in his opinion, the act is not being
complied with.
The general scope of the Wage and Hour law may be stated in a
few words. Every employee engaged in commerce or in the production
of goods for commerce shall be paid by his employer for his labor not
less than thirty cents an hour (or a higher rate fixed by wage order, up
to forty cents an hour) and if he is employed for more than forty hours
a week, he shall be paid for the excess hours at the rate of time and
one-half his regular rate of pay.
Unlike some other acts, the Wage-Hour law applies on an individual basis. It does not apply to specified industries or types of businesses.
It may apply to individual employees within a plant or office who are
working side by side with other individual employees who are not within
the coverage of the act. Furthermore, if an employee is engaged in any
work in interstate commerce, or in the production of goods for interstate
commerce, the employee will be within the general coverage of the act
regardless of the percentage which such work bears to all the work performed by him, or the percentage which such work represents of the total
business of his employer. As was stated in Interpretative Bulletin No. 5,
which was originally issued in December, 1938:
"There is no justification for determining the applicability
of the act to a particular employee on the basis of the percentage
of the goods he produces, or of his employer's goods, which move
in interstate commerce. * * * If in any work week an employee
produces goods for commerce and also produces goods for local
consumption or performs work otherwise outside the coverage of
the act, the employee is entitled to both the wage and hour benefits
of the act for all the time worked during that week. The proportion of the employee's time spent in each type of work is not material."
This position, which originally was simply an expression of the
opinion of the Administrator, is now supported by a number of court
decisions, including a decision rendered in the case of the United States V.
Darby1 , by the Supreme Court early this year. In this case the court
was asked to rule on a demurrer to a criminal indictment. The indictment charged that the defendant was engaged in manufacturing lumber
in Georgia with an intent to ship a part of such lumber into other states.
In a decision which firmly establishes the constitutionality of the act,
the court adopted the view previously taken by the Administrator in
1312 U. S. 100, 61 S. Ct. 451, 85 L. ed. 609, 132 A. L. R. 1430 (1941).
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these words: "While manufacturing is not of itself interstate commerce,
the shipment of manufactured goods interstate is such commerce, and
the prohibition of such shipment by Congress is indubitably a regulation
of the commerce * * * " Further, the court said, "Production for commerce * * * includes at least production of goods which at the time of
production the employer, according to the normal course of his business,
intends or expects to move in interstate commerce although, through the
exigencies of the business, all of the goods may not thereafter actually
The court concluded that Congress,
enter interstate commerce. * * *"
by this act, "adopted the policy of excluding from interstate commerce
all goods produced for the commerce which do not conform to the speciWhile there is undoubtedly more to be said confied labor standards."
cerning the scope of the act, this opinion appears to firmly establish its
basic constitutionality.
The United States District Court for Louisiana, in the case of
Abadie v. Cudahy Packing Company,2 held that Congress, to obtain its
objective, has made no distinction as to the volume or amount of shipments or of production for commerce which will subject any particular
shipper or producer to the substantive provisions of the act. The case of
Hart v. Gregory3 reaches a similar conclusion concerning the unimportance of the percentage factor, as do other cases which have now been
decided in practically every circuit in the United States.
It has been indicated by some courts, however, that while it is generally true that the percentage of goods produced or shipped is not the
determining test in coverage problems, there may still be instances in
which the courts will apply the maxim, de minimis non curat lex. 4 It
may be said, however, that even in these cases the courts have said that
the coverage of the act is not to be determined on a percentage basis.
They have simply held that in particular circumstances individual employees were engaged in interstate commerce in such a trifling or occasional fashion that the court would not concern itself with the problem.
For example, in the case of Goldberg v. Worman,5 the court called the
production of goods sold outside the state to the extent of $18 per week
out of a total business of $588 as trivial, infinitesimal, and inconsequential. Also, in the case of Gerdert v. Certified Poultry and Egg Company,"
the federal District Court in Florida held that isolated transactions which
are not a part of the usual course of business do not bring a wholesaler
within the act. In this case the court indicated that the test, which
should be applied to determine coverage, would be "the general course
of business."
It might be observed parenthetically that much of the
'C. C. H. 3 Labor Cases, 160, 314 (D. C. La. 1941).
'16 S. E. (2d) 837 (N. Car. 1941).
'The law does not regard trifles.-ED.
'37 F. Supp. 778 (D.

C. Fla. 1941).

'38 F. Supp. 964 (D. C. Fla. 1941).
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reasoning of the court seems less cogent if we recall that the act applies
on an individual work-week basis and that it has never been contended
that an act performed this week in interstate commerce or in the production of goods for interstate commerce will bring an employee within
the act for any number of subsequent work weeks.
In the case of Collins v.Kidd 7an ice distributor located at Texarkana in Texas sold approximately ten per cent of his ice across the border
in Arkansas. The court emphasized the fortuitous circumstances and
the influence of geography, and held that in such a case the sales in
Arkansas were inconsequential and trivial. In the case of Whitson v.
Wexler," an employee of a lumber yard who occasionally made pickups
or deliveries outside the state in which his employer maintained the lumber yard was held not entitled to the benefits of the act. The court
found the extra-state trips to be "infrequent and purely incidental, inconsequential, and insufficient" to show commerce.
In the case of Lamb v. Quality Bakery Company9 the defendant
was found to be selling one per cent of the goods produced in interstate
commerce, and the court held that these facts "do not show the defendant engaged in interstate commerce in any substantial or real sense."
All of these cases indicate that an employer probably would be
unwise to feel secure in the belief that the law did not apply to his operations simply because a very minor part of his activities were in interstate
commerce. Certainly the cases which have applied the de minimis doctrine to the problem of coverage are to be limited to the unusual facts
and circumstances existing in those cases. The Supreme Court itself, as
previously indicated, has stated that Congress in the act has, "adopted
the policy of excluding from interstate commerce all goods produced for
the commerce which do not conform to the specified labor standards." 10
With these general questions out of the way, then, we may turn
to a consideration of the bases for the application of the act. The act
applies to employees in commerce. Commerce "means trade, commerce,
transportation, transmission or communication among the several states
or from any state to any place outside thereof." Typically, this is interpreted by the Administrator to mean that the act applies to employees
in the telephone, telegraph, radio, and transportation industries. It also
is interpreted to mean that the act applies to clerical workers and to other
employees engaged in maintenance, repair, or reconstruction of essential
instrumentalities of commerce. Thus, all employees in any way contributing to the maintaining, repairing or reconstructing of railroads,
ships, highways, bridges, pipelines, navigable waters, or other essential
'38 F. Supp. 634 (D. C. Tex. 1941).
'C. C. H. 3 Labor Cases, 60, 283 (Tenn. Ch. 1941).

'C.
C. H. 3 Labor Cases, 60, 042 (Tenn. App. 1940).
' 0Supra note 1.
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instrumentalities of commerce, are deemed to be within the coverage of
the act.
The extent to which this general position will eventually be sustained by the courts is as yet uncertain.
It has also been the consistent position of the Wage-Hour Division
that employees engaged in the interstate distribution of goods, or who
are a part of the "stream of interstate commerce," are to be included in
the phrase "engaged in commerce." For example, employees of a warehouse whose storage facilities are used in the interstate distribution of
goods are thought to be within the coverage of the act. Also employees
of a wholesaler who is engaged in making sales in interstate commerce are
thought to be within the coverage of the act. This position has been
applied as extending the benefits of the act to employees engaged in
wholesale distribution of goods within a single state, if the goods are
obtained from outside the state.
Perhaps no point of coverage has been more often disputed than
the coverage of employees wholesaling within the state goods obtained
outside the state. In Gerdert v. Certified Poultry and Egg Company"
and in Jewell Tea Company t. Williams1 2 the federal courts have taken
a view of coverage which does not harmonize with the opinion expressed
by the Administrator. Both of these cases should be examined carefully with respect to the exact facts involved, and it should also be noted
that they were employee suits in which the Division did not participate.
In the case of Fleming v. Alterman Bros.- the position of the Division
concerning coverage of wholesalers was upheld by the federal District
Court for the northern district of Georgia. This case is now pending
on appeal to the Circuit Court.
It has uniformly been held by the Administrator that the act applies to newspapers if the newspapers use the instrumentalities of commerce in gathering and preparing news. This position was upheld by
the court in the case of Fleming v. Lowell Sun Company 4 and it was
stated that in such a case the interstate circulation of the newspaper will
not be determinative of coverage.
The Administrator has believed that certain financial institutions
are engaged in interstate commerce, and has therefore indicated that
efforts will be made to enforce the act against banks, savings and loan
associations, and insurance companies. As yet, however, no court decisions are available in contested cases in this field. A number of decrees
enjoining violations of the act have been entered by consent in cases
"Sunra note 6.

12 118F. (2d) 202 (C. C. A. 10th. 1941).
" 38 F. Supp. 94 (D. C. Ga. 1941).
36 F. Supp. 620 (D. C. Mass. 1940). rev'd 120 F. (2d)
1941).

213 (C. C. A. Ist.
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involving such institutions and at present it appears likely that litigation
may develop from investigations currently being made.
The second principal basis of coverage under the act is employment
in the production of goods for commerce. This term is a novel one, and
appears not to have been employed in any previous statutes enacted by
Congress. Section 3 (j) of the Fair Labor Standards Act defines the
term "produced" as meaning "produced, manufactured, mined, handled,
or in any other manner worked on in any state: and for the purposes
of this act an employee shall be deemed to have been engaged in the
production of goods if such employee was employed in producing, manufacturing, mining, handling, transporting, or in any other manner
working on such goods or in any process or occupation necessary to the
production thereof, in any state."
The Wage-Hour Division takes the general position that an employee is engaged in the production of goods for commerce when he is
working on goods which his employer knows, intends, or has reason to
believe will move in interstate commerce. A very similar interpretation
was applied by the Supreme Court in the Darby case.1 5 As indicated in
the passage I have previously cited, the court stated that production for
commerce includes at least production which "at the time of production
the employer, according to the normal course of his business, intends or
expects to move in interstate commerce."
In other decisions the courts have indicated that great importance
will be attached to circumstances which indicate that the employer should
be "charged with knowing" that the goods produced by him will move
in interstate commerce. It has been held, for example, that an employer
cannot argue that he does not know what will become of his goods and
that he has not produced them for commerce if he sells them to a purchaser within the state in which they were produced. The act is not
concerned with the ownership of goods sent into the channels of interstate commerce, nor with the identity of producer and shipper. In
Fleming v. Enterprise Box Company. 16 decided early this year in the
United States District Court for Florida and now on appeal to the Fifth
Circuit, it was held that an employer engaged in the production of cigar
boxes in the city of Tampa was engaged in the production of goods for
commerce, even though he sold all the cigar boxes to purchasers within
the state of Florida. The court found that the manufacturer should be
"charged with knowing what he should have known." Similar decisions have been made with respect to oil produced and sold to refiners
in the state of production, and to the production of metallic ore sold to
smelters within the state in which it was mined.
'Supra note 1.
136 F. Supp. 606 (D.C. Fia. 1940).
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Perhaps the most elastic phrase used in the law is the phrase "necessary to production."
It is said that production includes "any process
or occupation necessary" to the production of goods, In the very first
interpretative bulletin the Administrator pointed out that coverage "is
not limited necessarily to employees who are engaged in actual physical
work on the product itself * * *," but that the "benefits of the statute
are extended to such employees as maintenance workers, watchmen.
clerks, stenographers, messengers, all of whom must be considered as
engaged in processes or occupations 'necessary to the production' of the
goods." "Enterprises," said the Administrator, "cannot operate without
such employees. If they were not doing work 'necessary to the production' of the goods, they would not be on the payroll." The Administrator concluded that "except for the special categories of employees
within the exemptions of Section 13, all the employees, in a place of
employment where goods shipped or sold in interstate commerce were
produced, are included in the coverage, unless the employer maintains
the burden of establishing, as to particular employees, that their functions are so definitely segregated that they do not contribute to the production of the goods for interstate commerce as these terms are broadly
defined in the act." The courts appear to have accepted this interpretation, and decisions on this point almost without exception have indicated that the word "necessary" means "appropriate" and not "indispensable." In numerous cases the courts have held watchmen, firemen,
carpenters, electricians, engineers, mechanics, janitors, porters, handy
men, telephone operators, messengers, clerical workers, and other similar
employees to be engaged in processes or occupations necessary to the production of goods for commerce. Implicit in these holdings is the recognition that the scope of the activities embraced within Section 3 (j) is
not to be measured by a standard of absolute indispensability.
For such a construction of the act there is abundant authority in
cases construing and applying similar remedial labor legislation. For
example, in NationalLabor Relations Board v. Mackay Radio and Telegraph Company,'7 supervisors and clerks of telegraph agencies have been
included within the scope of the Labor Relations Act, as have editorial
employees of a news gathering and distributing agency in Associated
Press v. National Labor Relations Board, 8 and repairmen, clerks, and
others in other cases. I believe it may now be said to be the law that
employees are engaged in "production"-that is. in any process necessary to production-if their employer at the time of the employment
intends or has reason to believe that the employment will contribute even
indirectly to the production of goods for commerce.
'-1 N.L.R.B. 201 (1936), aff'd 87 F. (2d) 611, 92 F. (2d) 761 (C. C. A. 9th,
1-1N.L.R.B. 686 (1936). aff'd 85 F. (2d) 56 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1936), aff'd 301
U. S. 103, 57 S. Ct. 1650, 81 L. ed. 953 (1937).
1937). rev'd 304 U. S. 333, 58 S. Ct. 904, 82 L. ed. 1381 (1938).
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So much for coverage. But usually this is only half the story.
Employees, even though they are engaged in interstate commerce, may
be specifically exempt.
Recently, in an address delivered to the California Bar Association,
General Fleming illustrated the exemption problem in the following
remarks:
S"By way of illustrating the exemptions perhaps we may think
in terms of a large auditorium with a wide-open front door. Over
the door is the legend, 'Enter here, all ye who are employed in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce.' Through this
door march employees of American industry, many millions of
them.
"But the auditorium has a back door, several side doors, and
several windows through which some of the employees may escape.
We have even caught some of them trying to crawl up the chimney.
One door is labeled 'Agriculture,' another 'Retailing,' another
'Servicing,' another 'Executive,' and so on.
"And once having marshaled our employees into the auditorium we are invariably confronted with the necessity of opening a
door here, or a window there, so that some of them can squeeze
through and out."
Certain exemptions are blanketing in their effect, and exempt employees from both the minimum wage and maximum hour provisions
of the act. Employees engaged in agriculture are thus completely exempt
and agriculture is defined to include, among other things, dairying, the
cultivation, growing, and harvesting of any agricultural commodity, the
raising of livestock and poultry, and any practices performed by a farmer
or on a farm as an incident to or in conjunction with farming operations.
Also, the act completely exempts employees in a "bona fide executive, administrative, professional, or local retailing capacity, or in the
capacity of outside salesman (as such terms are defined and delimited by
regulations of the Administrator)." This exemption differs from most
of the others in that express authority is fixed in the Administrator to
define its scope. Presumably, if the Administrator's position is not arbitrary, his definition will be upheld by the courts. As yet there have been
no conclusive court tests of the validity of the definitions issued by the
Administrator.
Also, employees engaged in air transport, in sea-going ventures, in
the operation of street railways, in the operation of switchboards in small
telephone exchanges, and in the production of weekly or semi-weekly
newspapers with a circulation of less than 3,000, the larger part of
which is within the state of production, are exempt from both the minimum wage and maximum hour provisions of the act.
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However, perhaps the most important and certainly the most
troublesome exemption from both the minimum wage and maximum
hour provisions is that provided for "any employee engaged in any retail
or service establishment the greater part of whose selling or servicing is
in intrastate commerce." This exemption is peculiar in that it relates
specifically to the establishment rather than to the individual employee.
It has given rise to several difficult questions of interpretation which the
Division has tried to resolve in the notorious Interpretative Bulletin
No. 6.
It is not entirely clear what Congress meant by the term "service
establishment."
We have had correspondence with banks, insurance
companies, engineering firms, detective agencies, strike-breaking firms,
advertising agencies, toll bridge companies, public utility companies,
radio broadcasting stations, legal firms, dental supply houses and many
others, all claiming to be service establishments and therefore entitled to
the exemption. It is noteworthy, however, that Congress coupled this
exemption for employees of service establishments with the exemption
for the employees of retail establishments, and it would seem that it must
have had in mind establishments similar to retail establishments, such as
barber shops, neighborhood laundries and beauty parlors, which sell
service direct to the private consumer. Certainly Congress could not
have intended to include as service establishments telephone companies
or small weekly newspapers.
Another difficult question is what constitutes a retail establishment.
Some establishments engage in manufacturing or processing as well as
selling at retail, others conduct a wholesale business in connection with
retail selling. It seems clear that a factory, even though it does some
selling at retail, is not a retail establishment within the meaning of the
exemption.
The Administrator has attempted to find a workable solution of
these difficulties. In so doing it has been determined that if a substantial
amount of the sales of the establishment are non-retail sales, it may not
be classified as a retail establishment within the meaning of the exemption. A "substantial amount" is deemed to be more than twenty-five
per cent of the gross dollar volume of the total sales. Also, the Administrator has developed a doctrine of segregation by which it is held that
if an establishment has some employees who are exempt and some who
are not exempt, the employer may take steps to see that he is not deprived of the exemption for at least some the employees. For example,
if an establishment sells both at retail and wholesale, it is believed that
the employer may segregate in a physically separate establishment those
of his employees engaged only in local retail selling. However, if there
is no segregation and employees work in both departments of the business, the employer will lose the exemption.
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In addition to these complete exemptions from both the minimum
wage and maximum hour provisions of the act, there are other exemptions which apply only to the maximum hour provisions. Thus, for
example, employees of a railroad or motor carrier whose hours of service
are regulated by the Interstate Commerce Commission are exempt from
the forty-hour week. The reason for this exemption appears to be that
Congress wished to avoid giving to government agencies conflicting
authority with reference to the regulation of hours of work.
Also, employees engaged in the first processing of milk, the ginning
and compressing of cotton, and the processing of sugar beets are completely exempt from the hour provisions of the act.
Limited exemptions from the hour provisions of the act are available for employees engaged in industries determined by the Administrator
to be seasonal in character and also to employees engaged in the first
processing, canning, or packing of fresh fruits and vegetables, and in the
handling and slaughtering of poultry and livestock. Furthermore,
learners, apprentices, messengers, and handicapped workers may, under
appropriate circumstances, be employed at less than the minimum wage
prescribed in Section 6.
You will of course appreciate that each exemption to which I have
referred so glibly will in itself contain many problems. The variety of
problems arising from the application of these exemptions is amazing,
and after two years of continuous thinking about them, I have not yet
ceased to find a new problem each day. I often have the feeling that
employers and their attorneys feel that the administration of the law
involves the making of many fine distinctions, and that apparently we
make some of these fine distinctions simply for the fun of it. I can
assure you that this is not the case. We feel that it is our duty to enforce
the law, and we are trying to do it according to our best understanding
of what the law means and what we believe the courts will hold it to
mean. In connection with this general problem of exemptions, attention
should be called to the language used by the Circuit Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit in the case of Fleming v. Hawkeye Pearl Button
Company.19 The court said, "The manifest declared purpose of the
statute was to eradicate from interstate commerce the evils attendant upon
lower wages and long hours of service in industry. Accepting this as the
declared purpose of the act, exemptions would tend to defeat its purpose.
The statute is remedial, with a humanitarian end in view. It is, therefore, entitled to a liberal construction * * *. In such circumstances the
exemptions should be construed strictly."
In conclusion, I call your attention to the fact that it is important
to think clearly of the problems of coverage and exemption which I
'-113 F. (2d)

52 (C. C. A. 8th. 1940).
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have discussed, not only because they represent the law which the Wage
and Hour Division of the Department of Labor will undertake to enforce,
but also because the law confers upon individual employees the right to
bring suit to recover wages legally earned but withheld. There are many
interesting legal problems which arise in connection with these employee
suits.
It seems to me that we are now concluding the first episode in the
administration of the Wage-Hour law. During the past three years we
have been feeling our way and we have had few judicial decisions to
serve as guideposts. Much of our reasoning in regard to the application
of the act has had to stem from our understanding of the purpose of
Congress in enacting it. We are now entering a period in which we will
reach more mature development. Already the courts are stripping away
the areas of doubt and we may expect, I think, a rapid clarification of the
troublesome coverage problems.

Thirteenth Judicial Bar Held Annual Meeting
The Thirteenth Judicial Bar Association held its annual meeting
at Fort Morgan on December 19 with approximately forty lawyers in
attendance. The chief speaker at the meeting was W. W. Platt, who
spoke on the work and program of the Colorado Bar Association.
Officers elected for the new year were Webb Martin of Yuma, president, C. C. Rickel of Fort Morgan, vice-president, and Charles Kreager
of Sterling, secretary- treasurer.
The annual banquet was held in the Fort Morgan Country Club,
with Stoton Stephenson of Fort Morgan, retiring president, presiding.
Among those who gave short talks that evening were Judge J. Foster
Symes, Judge Norris Bakke, G. Dexter Blount, Wm. Hedges Robinson,
Jr., John Coen, and Thomas E. Munson. It is rumored that nearly
every member of the bar association responded with an impromptu toast
during the. course of the evening.

Junior Bar Section to Entertain
Newly Admitted Lawyers
Twenty-six persons took the bar examination during the first part
of January. Probably some of them will pass, and to these the Junior
Bar Section of the Colorado Bar Association will give a dinner following the admission ceremonies. All members of the bar are urged to
attend, not only to show their welcome, but also because the Junior Bar
Section promises an enjoyable evening. Because the date of the admission
ceremonies has not yet been set, the date of the dinner cannot be given,
but it is suggested that you watch for future announcement and plan to
be present.
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Quicquid Judicis Auctoritati Subjicitur,
Novitati non Subjicitur,
or Is It?
Pueblo lawyers quite frequently come across the following item
when examining abstracts of title. We are indebted to Robert S. Gast
for copying the document and sending it to us for publication. He has
not yet requested a ruling from the committee on uniform title opinions,
but indicates that they should be prepared for that eventuality.
Territory of New Mexico s
County of Mora
Before me, one of the Justices of the Peace of Precinct No. 1 (one)
of said County, appear in person Mess. Eugenio Nolan and Jose Maria
Barela, to me personally known, and said, The first that sell to the
second a piece of land containing one hundred and fifty yards of land,
situated in the Canado del Terromote, and also all his rights that he has
or may have for Inheritance in the goods and property of his dead Father,
Don Gerbacio Nolan, and all those claims that may be, as in Money,
Lands, Grants or personal property, and also, all the profits that to my
said buyer may result of my said Inheritance of all which I do trespass
for the value of one mare and saddle, one gun, one mule, one waggon
and a yoke of oxen and Sixty-eight dollars in cash making the sum of
three hundred and twenty-eight dollars with which he was pleased and
satisfied paid, and if worth more or may worth more he made a present
and Donation of the surplus to him and his heirs forever, and free of any
disturbance, and if any shall make any trouble, I request to the authorities not to attend him, neigther in just nor out of it, and for constacy,
I sign it together with the Seller and two witnesses in the Town of Santa
Gertrudis this fourteenth day of September, A. D. 1862.
Seller: Eugenio Nolan
Witness: Miguel Lucero and
Francisco Trugillo
I witnesseth it all, Ignacio Alvino Valdez, Justice of the Peace.
Territory of New Mexico !
County of Mora
I, the undersigned Clerk of the County Court and ex-officio Recorder in and for said County of Mora and Territory of New Mexico,
as aforesaid, that the instrument that appear is a correct copy taken from
the Register in this office from Book 1 (one) Page 75 of said Book.
In faith of which, I have set my hand and official seal of my office
in Mora, this fourth day of May, A. D. 1889.
Agapita Abeyta, Jr.
Clerk of the County Court and ex-office
(No Seal)
Recorder of Mora County, New Mexico.

Children of the Half Blood
BY C. EDGAR KETTERING*

An article showing considerable thought appeared in the June
number of DICTA' dealing with the construction of that part of the
1941 amendment to Section 4 of Chapter 176 of the 1935 Colorado
Statutes Annotated, relating to the inheritance by collateral relatives of
the half blood. I think the conclusions of the article "that children of
the intestate's half blood brother or sister cannot take," and "whether
the half blood can take might be open to argument," are incorrect and
violate the plain language of section 4, as amended.
The present statute reads: "Collateral relatives of the half blood
shall inherit only the half measure of collateral relatives of the whole
blood, if there be any of the last-named class living." What could be
clearer?
A half blood brother is surely a "collateral relative of the half
blood," and therefore he "shall inherit" half as much as he would if
he were a full brother. His children are nephews and nieces of the deceased and are therefore also "collateral relatives of the half blood.''
The right of inheritance of brothers and sisters and children of
deceased brothers and sisters is clearly set forth in Section 1, Chapter
176. The same rule of inheritance would apply in the case of half blood
brothers and sisters or half blood nephews and nieces, except that they
would receive only half as much as they would receive had they been
related by the full blood.
To illustrate: I was recently asked my opinion by a county judge
of another county on the following set of facts:
"A bachelor dies intestate, leaving an estate. He leaves two
living full brothers, the children of two dead full sisters and the
children of two dead half sisters. What is the right of inheritance
and in what shares?"
It would be my opinion that each of the two living full brothers
would receive a one-fifth interest; that the one-fifth share of each of the
two deceased full sisters would be divided between their respective children; and that the share of each of the half sisters would be one-tenth
(that is, "half measure of collateral relatives of the whole blood"), and
they being deceased, each of their shares would be divided between their
children respectively in the same manner as the share of the deceased full
brother or sister would be divided among his or her children.
I do not believe the 1941 amendment was unwise or unnecessary,
as indicated by the above mentioned article; but, regardless of that, I
*Of the Denver bar and judge of the Denver county court.
'Thomas, Children of the Half Blood (1941) 18 DICTA 158.
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believe the present language is unambiguous and accomplishes what the
legislature obviously intended and what the author of the above article
agrees should have been accomplished.

Regional Institutes Planned for Entire State
by Colorado Bar Committee
The winter institute program of the state bar has been proving a
great success, according to reports received from the local bar association
officials where institutes have been held so far. Boulder County Bar Association officials stated that the institute held there on January 24th was
well attended and enthusiastically received. The theme for discussion
was some of the more common problems of insurance encountered by
the practicing lawyer. Other institutes have been held in Durango, Pueblo and Denver.
Institutes have been planned for Glenwood Springs, Greeley, Colorado Springs and Loveland. The Glenwood Springs institute, according
to tentative plans formulated by Edward L. Wood, chairman of the
state committee, call for a two-day program on February 20 and 21.
The first day will be devoted to a discussion of the proposed water
code, and the second day will feature problems of estate and title law.
The Weld County association will hold its institute on February 28.
This institute, which will be held in the district court room commencing
at three o'clock, will treat with several phases of the problem of negligence. After dinner for the bar, to be held in the Odd Fellows' Hall,
the evening session will feature short talks by Judge Frederick W. Clark,
W. W. Platt and William R. Kelly. Federal income tax problems of a
farming community will be the subject of the evening's principal address.
which will be delivered by William W. Wardwell of the federal revenue
department. No definite date has been fixed for the meetings to be held
in Loveland and Colorado Springs, but they are being planned for March.
Other sections of the state have indicated that institutes are being formulated for these localities to be held in the early spring. The University of
Colorado is, of course, planning an annual Law Day, which will probably be scheduled for April.
The state bar and the Denver association are working on plans for
a medico-legal institute to be held in the early spring. According to
present suggestions, this institute will deal with such problems as the
expert witness, problems of evidence dealing with medical questions, and
an explanation of some of the more common types of physical and mental injuries.
A combined institute and fish fry is planned for the latter part of
May at Monte Vista. For further details of all of these institutes watch
subsequent issues of DICTA.

DICTA

Board of Governors Opposes Laska
Application for Restatement
The Board of Governors of the Colorado Bar Association has filed
a statement in opposition to the plea of Ben B. Laska for readmission
to the bar. This statement was filed in conformity with a resolution
adopted by the Board of Governors in a special meeting, at which time
it was the opinion of the board that Ben B. Laska "should not be readmitted to practice law in the State of Colorado." The resolution also
empowered the president to appoint a committee to file a brief in behalf
of the bar association in opposition to the plea made by Mr. Laska. The
Denver Bar Association likewise adopted a similar resolution when its
executive committee and Board of Trustees unanimously adopted a
resolution that it was also of the opinion that Mr. Laska should not
be admitted to the practice of law in this state.
The plea made by Mr. Laska was filed on December 5, 1941, by his
attorneys, Philip Hornbein, Theodore Epstein, and Leo Moses. It
stated that Mr. Laska, being of advanced age, sought an "opportunity to
rehabilitate himself in the eyes of his professional brethren and the
community." It further stated that the respondent had "no other trade,
calling or business capacity which will qualify him for any other branch
of human endeavor," and that if he were readmitted the respondent
would make it "the supreme purpose of his life" to conduct himself "in
accordance with the high ethics of the profession."
The statement filed by the state bar is based upon the proposition
that Mr. Laska was paroled from the federal penitentiary on June 2,
1941, and under the terms of the parole law he remains under the legal
custody and control of the warden of the prison. He was convicted of
the crime of conspiracy to violate the kidnapping statute and was sentenced to ten years, the sentence expiring July 3 1, 1946. By reason of
the fact that he was convicted of a felony and he is still serving this sentence, the brief contends that he is not a citizen and is not qualified to
petition for readmission. The brief also points out that the statutes and
constitution of the state defining the public policy of the state toward
one convicted of a felony disqualify Laska from practicing law in Colorado.
In addition, in urging that the petition be denied by the Supreme
Court on the merits of the case alone, the brief contends that the petition filed in behalf of Mr. Laska is insufficient. It points out that the
petition is not signed by Mr. Laska and he has not bound himself by it
in any way. It also points out that the petition is not verified by anyone.
In addition no affidavits showing his moral qualifications accompany the petition. The letters which are attached thereto mention no
facts which affirmatively show any "moral rehabilitation of Laska."

DICTA
Within the short period of twenty-two months since his disbarment,
such a showing cannot well be made, the brief contends. Since the
"vital consideration" of an application for reinstatement is the rehabilitation of the applicant, the court should have "clear and convincing"
proof that the applicant "has reformed and now possesses the necessary qualifications to practice law."
The brief filed by the state bar characterizes the petition as a
prayer for sympathy," and suggests that it overlooks the question of
the general welfare of the people and the public good, which are involved
in such applications. The brief concludes that the "readmission to
practice law in Colorado of a man who is still serving his punishment
for the commission of a felony termed 'as black a conspiracy as ever
was hatched,' would, we think, serve to destroy the confidence of the
public in the legal profession and in the administration of justice."

Junior Bar Section Spring Meeting
and Valentine's Day Party
On February 14, 1942, the Junior Bar Section of the Colorado Bar
Association will hold its annual spring meeting and Valentine's Day
party at the Cosmopolitan Hotel in Denver. The program:
Meeting from 2:30 to 5:00 P. M. in room D on the mezzanine.
Entertainment for ladies from 2:30 to 5:00 P. M. in the Denver
Room on the mezzanine.
Cocktail hour at 6:30 P. M. in the Denver Room.
Dinner and dancing at 8:30 in the Silver Glade.
The entire program is for members only, their wives and sweethearts, and is moderately priced. Further information may be had from
Sydney E. Shuteran, chairman of the committee on meetings and entertainment, 619 Midland Savings Building, Denver.

Report of Real Estate Committee to be
Presented to Denver Bar
The February meeting of the Denver Bar Association, which will
be held on Monday, February 2, 1942, at 12:15 P. M. in the Chamber
of Commerce dining room, will be given over to the association's real
estate committee. A timely and interesting symposium on real estate
topics is to be presented.

